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NOTE 
On-Call lime Under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
Eric Phillips 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic pressures, changing family structures, and technology 
have increasingly blurred the line between work time and personal 
time. The rise of independent contracting, the growing number of 
families in which both parents work, and the. expanding reach of 
computer networks, fax machines, pagers, and mobile telephones, 
to provide a few examples, have blurred the once-familiar distinc­
tion between work time and leisure time.1 This distinction is partic­
ularly unclear for on-call employees. 
An on-call employee is one who may be physically away from 
the workplace but who remains connected to it by telephone, 
beeper, computer, or radio, and who must respond to the employer 
if called.2 While on call, an employee generally does not face the 
constraints he may face while on a regular shift at his employer's 
premises. He may be able to go shopping or watch television dur­
ing his on-call hours, for example. At the same time, even though 
he may have a greater measure of freedom than he does while 
working a normal shift, he is never truly free from work. The em­
ployer may interrupt the employee's personal activities without 
warning, and the threat of interruption may prevent him from en­
gaging in certain activities altogether, either because he would not 
be able to return to work quickly enough, or because some activi­
ties - such as attending movies or sporting events - require a 
solid block of time and thus would be impractical. Moreover, non­
payment for on-call time can be inequitable: employers obtain 
value from the on-call services, enabling them to reduce staff or 
1. See Clare Ansberry, Workers Are Forced to Take More Jobs with Few Benefits: Firms 
Use Contract Labor and Temps to Cut Costs and Increase Flexibility, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 
1993, at Al; Sue Shellenbarger, Firms Make the Most of Flexible Scheduling, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 12, 1993, at Bl. 
2. On-call service may require an employee to return to his employer's premises, see, e.g., 
Bright v. Houston Northwest Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1991) (en bane), 
or simply respond by telephone, see, e.g., Berry v. County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 
1994). 
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limit compensable hours worked without compensating the employ­
ees who have forgone personal activities.3 
The distinction between work and personal time is especially 
important for on-call employees covered by the Fair Labor Stan­
dards Act (FLSA or the Act).4 The minimum wage and overtime 
requirements of the FLSA require proper categorization of an em­
ployee's service as either work or leisure time. Employers must pay 
any employee covered by the FLSA5 at least the minimum wage for 
all hours they "work," and must pay an overtime premium for 
hours in excess of a forty-hour week.6 The FLSA does not permit 
an employee to waive or contract around these minimum require­
ments. 7 Thus, the definition of work is important: if on-call duty is 
not "work," the employee need only receive compensation for time 
spent actively responding to his employer's call.s If on-call duty is 
"work," however, the employee must be paid at least the minimum 
wage for the time spent on call. 
Although on-call arrangements are not new, until recently 
courts rarely dealt with the question of whether on-call arrange­
ments constituted work for purposes of the FLSA. The FLSA of­
fers little direct guidance on this matter,9 and while the Supreme 
Court has ruled on cases involving "waiting time" - time spent on 
3. See Christopher S. Miller et al., On-Call Policies Help Avoid Overtime Pay, 
HRMAoAZINE, July 1996, at 57, 57 (noting that placing employees on call can keep them 
ready to respond to employer needs but simultaneously "off the clock"). 
4. 29 u.s.c. §§ 201-219 {1994). 
5. The FLSA covers approximately 60% of the nation's workers, or about 80 million 
people. See Jon Tevlin, Workplace Dilemma: Cash or Time Off?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR­
TRIBUNE, May 5, 1997, at Dl. Among the largest groups of employees exempt from the 
FLSA's provisions are professional, administrative, and executive employees. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 213(a){l) {1994); 51B C.J.S. Labor Relations§§ 1086-1138 {1968) {discussing the scope of 
the FLSA's coverage). 
6. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207. As an illustration of how on-call duty does not fit into our 
traditional notion of work and is not adequately addressed by federal statutes, consider a 
hypothetical situation in which on-call duty prevents an employee from caring for a sick 
family member - because the employee might have to return to work for calls - but in 
which that duty is still not considered "work" under the FLSA. The on-call employee would 
have to take time off from work under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 2601-2654 (Supp. 1997), to ensure uninterrupted leisure time to care for the person, even 
though he is not "working" under the FLSA. Cf. infra note 61 (noting that work need not 
require exertion). 
7. See infra section III.B. 
8. There is no dispute that employees must be paid for the time spent actually responding 
to calls. The dispute relates to time spent waiting to be called by the employer. 
9. Congress has been presented with the difficult questions raised by on-call work, but 
has not addressed these questions. See Oversight of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1996: 
Hearings on the Purpose, History, and Regulatory Requirements of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act as Applied in the Public and Private Sectors Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and 
Human Resources, 104th Cong., 6-7 {1996) [hereinafter Hearings] {letter of Pete Wilson, 
Governor of California) (arguing for exclusion of public employees from FLSA coverage in 
part because states fear windfalls that could be given to firefighters and investigators for their 
on-call duty). 
August 1997] Note-FLSA 2635 
the employer's premises or within "hailing distance"lO - it has 
never squarely addressed the issues raised by on-call time. Only in 
the past decade have federal appellate courts examined whether 
particular on-call arrangements require compensation under the 
FLSA.11 
Because on-call arrangements do not fit neatly into traditional 
notions of "work," and because the FLSA does not adequately de­
fine the term, courts have struggled to create a rational approach 
for determining whether an on-call employee is working, and thus 
entitled to the statutory minimum wage and overtime guarantees 
for his time on call.12 Courts have disagreed with each other,13 
10. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 
U.S. 126 (1944). "Hailing distance" has been defined as "1: the limit to which a human voice 
is heard . . .  2: a close proximity: short reach . . . .  " WEBSTER'S T lllRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
D1cnONARY 1020 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1986). At the time Armour and Skidmore were 
decided, it is probable that there were fewer workers on call than there are now. Technologi­
cal innovations such as telephones and pagers were either not widely available or did not 
exist. Wealthier citizens who were more likely to own telephones were often not covered by 
the FLSA because they were professional, administrative, or executive employees. Compare 
BUREAU OF TIIE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF TIIE 
UNITED STATES 783 (1975) (stating that in 1938 only 34.6% of U.S. households had tele­
phones) with BUREAU OF TIIE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 
OF nm UNITED STATES 561 (1996) (stating that in 1994 93.9% of U.S. households had 
telephones). 
11. Compare Berry v. County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that no 
compensation is required), Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802 (11th Cir. 1992) (same), 
Owens v. I'IT Rayonier, Inc., 971 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1992) (same), Martin v. Ohio Turnpike 
Commn., 968 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1992) (same), Bright v. Houston Northwest Med. Ctr. Survi­
vor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (same) and Brock v. El Paso Natural Gas 
Co., 826 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1987) (same) with Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529 (10th 
Cir. 1991) (requiring compensation) and Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Commn., 938 F.2d 912 
(8th Cir. 1991) (same). 
12. See Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., 864 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The FLSA's 
minimum wage and overtime requirements . . .  are designed to apply readily and easily to 
workers whose jobs require them to show up at specific hours and to work more or less 
continuously while on their employers' premises."). 
13. Compare Renfro, 948 F.2d 1529 (granting compensation when employees were inter­
rupted three to five times per twenty-four hours of on-call duty) with Berry, 30 F.3d 1174 
(refusing to grant compensation when employees were interrupted approximately four times 
per twenty-four hours of on-call duty). The court in Berry distinguished Renfro partly be­
cause the employees in Berry responded by telephone or radio within fifteen minutes, 
whereas the employees in Renfro had to return to their employer's premises. See Berry, 30 
F.3d at 1184, 1186. According to the district court in Berry, however, even though there was 
no specific response time required for the return call, in practice the employees, who were 
coroners, responded to many calls "as soon as possible." Berry v. Sonoma County, 791 F. 
Supp. 1395, 1403 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Often this required the coroners to report to their offices 
or to the scene of a death. See 791 F. Supp. at 1405. Thus, the employees, in fact, were 
constrained in what they were able to do during the time on call. This suggests that the actual 
practice differed from the employer's stated rule. If in practice an employee must return to 
his employer's premises, the situation should be treated the same as if there were a rule 
explicitly requiring the return. Cf. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 137 (holding that courts must ex­
amine the "practical construction of the working agreement by conduct"). 
There are differences among the circuits as to which general analysis and specific factors 
to apply in deciding whether a particular type of on-call duty is work. See infra section I.C. 
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often applying conclusory analysis14 and have permitted extraneous 
issues to muddle their analyses.15 In light of the predominantly fac­
tual basis of the question raised in on-call cases, a mechanical test 
likely cannot resolve the issue.16 Courts therefore must examine all 
the circumstances involved in the on-call arrangement.17 
This Note attempts to clarify the analysis for determining 
whether an employee is "working" while on call. Part I explains 
that neither the FLSA nor the Supreme Court provides clear gui­
dance for defining "work" in on-call cases. Part II argues that when 
deciding on-call cases, courts should look to how the on-call ar­
rangement both burdens the employee and benefits the employer. 
Part III contends that courts should eliminate two extraneous issues 
from their current analysis of on-call cases: whether an employee 
may trade an on-call shift, and whether employees and employers 
can decide for themselves through a contract whether on-call ser­
vice is work. 
I. THE MUDDLED LEGAL HISTORY OF ON-CALL EMPLOYMENT 
This Part sets out the basic guideposts courts have used to ex­
amine on-call time and explains why they lead to inconsistent re­
sults. Section I.A describes the statutory and regulatory schemes 
governing the definition of work and finds that they are either 
vague or incomplete. Section l.B reviews the relevant Supreme 
14. See Sanniento v. City of Denver, No. 95-1225, 1996 WL 169806, at *3 (10th Cir. Apr. 
11, 1996) (containing a perfunctory discussion of the evidence); Pfister v. City of New Orle­
ans, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 559, 564 (E.D. La. 1993) (same); Spires v. Ben Hill 
County, 745 F. Supp. 690, 702 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (same). 
15. See, e.g., Service Employees Intl. Union Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 60 F.3d 
1346, 1354 (9th Cir. 1995) (considering the ability to trade on-call shifts to be relevant); 
Berry, 30 F.3d 1174 (same); Owens, 971 F.2d at 351 (same). Section III.A argues that the 
ability to trade on-call shifts is irrelevant to the determination of whether an employee is 
working while on call. Section III.B argues that employers and employees cannot contract 
around the requirements of the Act. 
16. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138 (1944). 
17. As the Supreme Court noted fifty years ago, there can be no "legal formula" to re­
solve the question of whether or not an employee is working. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136 
(noting that factual situations differ). In addition to the difficulty of determining whether an 
on-call employee is working, practical considerations may affect the resolution of the issue. 
Payment for on-call service can impose large and often unexpected costs on employers that 
some find excessive for the service rendered. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 6-7 (letter of 
Pete Wilson) (claiming that state and local governments fear windfalls given to public em­
ployees for their on-call duty). Consequently, courts may be reluctant to find that on-call 
time is work, even though a balanced interpretation of the FLSA indicates that workers 
should receive payment for that time. A coherent framework of analysis would reduce em­
ployers' uncertainty and correspondingly reduce the likelihood of unexpected or unfair 
awards of wages to on-call employees, leading to a more equitable appJication of the law. See 
infra part II. 
As with the resolution of any fact-intensive issue, the implementation of a legal frame­
work will not eliminate difficult judgments. The analysis in this Note attempts to bring the 
inquiry into sharper focus by defining the important factors and eliminating irrelevant ones. 
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Court decisions on this issue and concludes that they similarly fail 
to provide concrete guidance. Section I.C contends that neither the 
statute nor Supreme Court decisions adequately facilitates consis­
tent application by lower courts. 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Guideposts 
The FLSA does not define work. It merely states that to 
"'[e]mploy' includes to suffer or permit to work."18 The Depart­
ment of Labor's regulations under the FLSA also provide no clear 
guidance. Under the regulations, 
[a ]n employee who is required to remain on call on the employer's 
premises or so close thereto that he cannot use the time effectively for 
his own purposes is working while "on call". An employee who is not 
required to remain on the employer's premises but is merely required 
to leave word at his home or with company officials where he may be 
reached is not working while on call.19 
This definition properly indicates that the burden on the employee 
is the paramount consideration in resolving the question,20 but ulti­
mately is of little help to courts in determining whether an on-call 
employee must receive the minimum wage or overtime.21 
The regulations are both too vague and too narrow. On one 
hand, they leave the courts with a great deal of discretion and lead 
to contradictory conclusions in similar situations.22 Although the 
regulations focus on whether an employee can use his time "effec-
18. 29 u.s.c. § 203(g) (1994). 
19. 29 C.F.R. § 785.17 (1996) (emphasis added). 
20. See infra section II.A. An exclusive focus on the burden on the employee does not 
resolve the issue, however, because it does not capture important equitable concerns that the 
FLSA advances. An employer gains from an on-call arrangement because it does not need 
to hire an additional worker to come in and wait for work, and the benefit to the employer 
can in some situations weigh in favor of requiring payment for on-call time. See infra section 
11.B. 
21. The regulations are not controlling on the courts, but are entitled to weight only to 
the degree to which they are persuasive. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Some courts, 
though, have given greater deference to the regulations than is appropriate. See Renfro v. 
City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529, 1537 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that an agency's construction of 
its own regulation is entitled to substantial deference). Congress did not provide the Secre­
tary of Labor with authority to define work under the statute, and the regulations are there­
fore interpretative rules entitled to deference only to the extent to which they are persuasive. 
See KENNETII CuLP DA VIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINIS1RATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.3 
(3d ed. 1994) (discussing the difference between legislative and interpretative rules). In this 
case, the regulation is not persuasive because it would never require compensation for an 
employee who is on call away from his employer's premises. See infra note 23 and accompa­
nying text. 
22. For example, the courts in both Bright v. Houston Northwest Medical Center Survivor, 
Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 676 (5th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (refusing to grant compensation where em­
ployee was required to return to work within twenty minutes and was subject to three inter­
ruptions per on-call shift), and Renfro, 948 F.2d at 1535 (granting compensation where 
employees were required to return within twenty minutes and were interrupted an average of 
three to five times per on-call shift), relied in part on the regulations yet reached divergent 
conclusions on similar facts. 
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tively," that focus does not provide sufficient guidance. On the 
other hand, the regulations do not account adequately for the possi­
bility that an employee may be entitled to compensation under the 
FLSA even when he is waiting on call more than a short distance 
from his employer's premises.23 
B. Supreme Court Guideposts 
The Supreme Court, in two "waiting time" cases, Armour & Co. 
v. Wantock24 and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,25 set out several helpful 
principles that lower courts have used in determining whether an 
on-call employee is working. These cases involved firefighters who 
waited on or near the employer's premises to be called to activity. 
In Armour, the Court determined that time spent waiting for work 
could be classified as work time under the FLSA.26 In Skidmore, 
the Court indicated that the touchstone in such cases is whether the 
"time is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit or for the 
employee's."27 Any such inquiry, the Court noted, is heavily fact­
dependent28 and "involves scrutiny and construction of the agree­
ments between the particular parties, appraisal of their practical 
construction of the working agreement by conduct, consideration of 
the nature of the service, and its relation to the waiting time, and of 
all of the surrounding circumstances. "29 
Lower courts have relied on Armour and Skidmore when deter­
mining whether the FLSA requires compensation in on-call cases. 
But while the guideposts contained in those waiting-time cases are 
useful and provide the basis for the broad contours of this Note, 
they do not adequately tell courts how to reach consistent conclu­
sions in cases involving on-call arrangements. Waiting-time cases 
present very broad principles applied to factual situations that differ 
from on-call cases. On-call cases are more difficult to resolve than 
waiting-time cases because, unlike the situations in Armour and 
Skidmore, in which the employees were required to remain on or 
close to the employer's premises,30 most contemporary on-call ar-
23. Every circuit that has examined on-call time has acknowledged that an employee may 
be entitled to compensation under the FLSA even if he does not remain on or very close to 
the employer's premises. The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
decided on-call cases. See, e.g., Owens v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 971 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1992); 
Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802 (11th Cir. 1992); Martin v. Ohio Turnpike Commn., 
968 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1992); Renfro, 948 F.2d 1529; Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Commn., 938 
F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1991); Bright, 934 F.2d 671. 
24. 323 U.S. 126 (1944). 
25. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
26. See Armour, 323 U.S. at 132-34. 
27. 323 Skidmore, U.S. at 133. 
28. See Armour, 323 U.S. at 133; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 137. 
29. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 137. 
30. See Armour, 323 U.S. at 126; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 134. 
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rangements provide for greater physical freedom, permitting em­
ployees to go home and perform certain tasks for the employer 
without having to return to the employer's premises.31 At the same 
time, the burden on the on-call employee may be greater. On-call 
shifts sometimes may last longer than waiting shifts and, in extreme 
cases, on-call employees may be placed on call the entire time they 
are not performing their regular service.32 The differences between 
on-call cases and waiting-time cases thus compel a different 
analysis. 
C. Confusion in the Lower Courts 
Lower courts have not applied consistent analysis to on-call 
cases. The courts have disagreed over the broad outline of the test 
for determining what is work. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits re­
quire compensation only when a severe burden has been placed on 
the employee,33 whereas the Tenth Circuit merely asks whether the 
burden on the employee interferes with the employee's personal 
pursuits.34 The elements of the test also vary among the circuits. 
For example, the Ninth Circuit looks at eight different factors,35 
while other courts apply fewer.36 Some of these factors - for ex-
31. See, e.g., Berry v. County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174, 1178 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that 
coroners who were on call could conduct some investigations from their homes). 
32. See Bright v. Houston Northwest Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 680 (5th Cir. 
1991) (en bane) (Williams, J., dissenting) (noting that continuous on-call service precludes a 
wide range of activities); infra note 78. But see infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text 
(arguing that the FLSA does not provide relief from continual on-call duty). 
33. See Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802, 810 (11th Cir. 1992) (requiring that a 
"severe" burden be compensated); Martin v. Ohio Turnpike Comrnn., 968 F.2d 606, 611 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (holding that to prevail an employee must show that the on-call duty "seriously" 
interferes with personal activities); see also Lurvey v. Metropolitan Dade County, 870 F. 
Supp. 1570, 1579 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (citing Birdwell). 
34. See Armitage v. City of Emporia, 982 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir. 1993). 
35. In Owens v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 971 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1992), the court examined 
(1) whether there was an on-premises living requirement; (2) whether there were exces­
sive geographical restrictions on employee's movements; (3) whether the frequency of 
calls was unduly restrictive; (4) whether a fixed time limit for response was unduly re­
strictive; (5) whether the on-call employee could easily trade on-call responsibilities[;] 
(6) whether use of a pager could ease restrictions; and (7) whether the employee had 
actually engaged in personal activities during call-in time. 
971 F.2d at 351 (footnotes omitted). The Owens court also examined the employment agree­
ment. See 971 F.2d at 354; see also Berry, 30 F.3d at 1183 (relying on the Owens factors). 
This Note argues that at least two of the Owens factors are not relevant to the question of 
whether on-call time is work. See infra Part III (arguing that courts should not consider 
whether employees can trade on-call duty, and that the existence of an agreement regarding 
the on-call time should not be given weight). 
36. See Armitage, 982 F.2d at 432 (emphasizing the number of interruptions and the 
amount of time an employee has to return to a call); Birdwell, 970 F.2d at 808 (determining 
whether the on-call time was predominantly for the employer's benefit by examining whether 
employees could leave home while on call or work more than one job); Martin, 968 F.2d at 
611-12 (examining whether the on-call employee could undertake personal pursuits by em­
phasizing the frequency of the calls and whether the call-in system was cumbersome); Renfro 
v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529, 1537-38 (10th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing the number of 
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ample, the ability to trade on-call shifts - have not been embraced 
uniformly,37 and as discussed in Part III, do not further the analysis. 
In addition, nearly all circuits to consider on-call cases have failed 
to give adequate weight to the benefit an employer receives from 
the on-call arrangement.38 Consequently, courts have reached dif­
ferent conclusions in cases with similar facts.39 
II. DEFINING WoRK IN ON-CALL CASES 
This Part seeks to bring greater coherence to the determination 
of whether an on-call employee is working within the meaning of 
the FLSA. Courts should consider both the burden the on-call time 
places on the employee and the benefit the on-call employee pro­
vides to the employer.40 Section II.A proposes an analytic ap­
proach to measure the burden on the employee. The burden on the 
employee is generally the focus of the dispute; whether a court finds 
that an employee's obligations constitute work most often depends 
on what he actively does for the employer and the extent to which 
the on-call service constrains his personal activities.41 Section II.B 
argues that courts should give greater weight to the benefit to the 
employer than they generally have. When the on-call activity - or 
inactivity - closely resembles regular duty, courts should presume 
the on-call time provides a valuable benefit to the employer. The 
greater the benefit to the employer, the more likely it is that the 
courts should require the employer to pay the minimum wage. 
callbacks, whether the employee could hold another job, whether the employee could trade 
shifts, and whether the time could be used for personal pursuits); Cross v. Arkansas Forestry 
Commn., 938 F.2d 912, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that there could be no legal formula but 
emphasizing the ability to travel or to engage in personal activities, the required response 
time, the difficulty of monitoring calls, the possibility of the need to respond immediately, 
and whether the on-call employee was ever relieved from duty (citing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 
U.S. 134, 136 (1944))). 
37. See infra Part III. 
38. Compare, e.g., Owens, 971 F.2d at 353-54 (examining seven factors and finding the 
benefit to the employer irrelevant) and Allen v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 724 F.2d 1131, 1137 
(5th Cir. 1984) (examining benefit to employer, but giving it little weight) with Renfro, 948 
F.2d at 1538 (giving weight to the benefit to the employer). For a discussion of the signifi­
cance of the benefit to the employer, see infra section 11.B. 
39. See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944) (noting that courts limit the 
scope of their opinions to the specific facts of the case and thus "[g]eneral expressions trans­
posed to other facts are often misleading"); see also supra notes 13, 22. 
40. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
41. See Armour, 323 U.S. at 133 (focusing on "[w]hether time is spent predominantly for 
the employer's benefit or the employee's"); cf. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda 
Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944) (noting that work generally involves physical or 
mental exertion). 
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A. Burden on Employee 
This section argues that when courts consider the burden im­
posed on the on-call employee, they should examine (1) the 
number of times an employee is interrupted or called back to work; 
(2) the duration of the callbacks and interruptions; and (3) the 
amount of time an employee has before he must return to work. 
Courts should examine each of these factors in the context of the 
others; each of them alone might impose a minor burden, but sev­
eral or all of them in combination could constitute a burden deserv­
ing compensation under the FLSA. When one element is especially 
burdensome, however, it may by itself compel compensation. 
Courts should continue to give great weight to the first factor, 
the number of times the employer interrupts the employee or calls 
him back to the employer's premises. Frequent interruptions indi­
cate that the on-call service both actively burdens the employee42 
and prevents him from engaging in personal activity, and may indi­
cate that the on-call time closely resembles normal working hours, 
which, of course, would be compensable under the FLSA. In gen­
eral, courts have found that where an employee is called back to 
work two or fewer times per twenty-four hours of on-call duty, the 
employee need not be compensated for the time he is inactive.43 If, 
as anecdotal evidence suggests, the average call takes between one 
and three hours,44 two callbacks per twenty-four hours of on-call 
time should leave the employee with sufficient time to pursue most 
42. See, e.g., Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802, 807, 810 {11th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that an on-call employee, although required to report to his employer immediately and for­
bidden to leave town, was not sufficiently burdened to be entitled to compensation because 
he had never been called back); Renfro, 948 F.2d at 1537-38 (indicating that the frequency of 
callbacks - three to five per 24 hours - burdened the employee and was critical to the 
court's conclusion that employees must receive compensation for on-call duty). 
43. Unless the court has found a significant constraint on an on-call employee beyond the 
number of interruptions, such as a quick response time, see Oliver v. Mercy Med. Ctr., Inc., 
695 F.2d 379 {9th Cir. 1982) (noting the district court's unappealed ruling that on-call em­
ployees who had three minutes to return to work must be compensated for their on-call 
time), or constant attention to a radio, see Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Commn., 938 F.2d 912, 
917 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that employees could prevail where they were permitted to go 
35-50 miles from home but were required to monitor radio calls continuously), employees 
have rarely prevailed when the number of interruptions or callbacks per day is two or fewer. 
See, e.g., Armitage v. City of Emporia, 982 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1992) (denying compensation 
when there were fewer than two callbacks per week); St. Clair v. City of Iola, No. 92-4024, 
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14116, at *10 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 1994) (denying compensation for 1.15 
interruptions per 24 hours); Cleary v. ADM Milling Co., 827 F. Supp. 472, 476 (N.D. Ill. 
1993) {denying compensation for 1.25 calls per week); Burnison v. Memorial Hosp., Inc., 820 
F. Supp. 549, 552 (D. Kan. 1993) (denying compensation when there were 1.1 to 1.4 calls per 
24 hours). 
44. Cf. Renfro, 948 F.2d at 1531 (average callback of one hour); Bright v. Houston North­
west Med. Ctr. Survivor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 673 (5th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (involving callbacks 
that averaged less than two hours and forty minutes); Cleary, 827 F. Supp. at 473 (average 
call, excluding travel time, of one hour and ten minutes). 
2642 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:2633 
of the same activities in which he would be able to engage if not on 
call.45 
Courts should also consider the length of the interruptions in 
determining the employee's burden. When a response to a call is 
lengthy, the employee faces a greater burden because he has less 
time in that on-call shift to conduct other activities. For example, 
an on-call employee who is interrupted simply to provide an answer 
to a question over the telephone bears much less of a burden than 
an employee who must return to his employer's premises. 
The final factor, the amount of time within which an employee 
must return to the employer's premises, also determines much of 
the burden he faces while on call. A required response time of 
three minutes is far more burdensome than a response time of 
twenty minutes.46 Like the requirement that an employee remain 
on the employer's premises while on call, a short response time can 
restrict the activities an employee may pursue while on call. 
As a benchmark, courts should find that response times of 
twenty minutes or more do not, by themselves, burden the em­
ployee enough to require compensation under the FLSA. Requir­
ing a response in less than twenty minutes dramatically narrows the 
range of the employee's activities: workers in the United States 
live, on average, approximately twenty minutes from work,47 and 
thus could go no farther from work than their home - or outside a 
twenty minute radius from work if they carry a pager or mobile 
telephone - and would have to cease their activity immediately 
when called. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most people engage 
in nearly all of their leisure pursuits within a short distance of their 
homes,48 and if employees live twenty minutes from their work­
place and do not go far from home in their off time, a twenty­
minute response time permits them to do nearly all of the things 
45. See, e.g., Bright, 934 F.2d at 674, 676 (involving employees who were called back an 
average of four to five times per week and who, while on call, could engage in normal per­
sonal activities at home, go shopping, and eat at restaurants); Cleary, 827 F. Supp. at 473-74 
(involving employee who was called back, on average, 1.25 times per week and who could, 
while on call, go to the movies or the pool hall, watch television, entertain friends and family, 
and garden); Burnison, 820 F. Supp. at 552-53 (involving an employee called back 1.1 to 1.4 
times per 24 hours who could, while on call, watch television, do housework, write letters, 
listen to music, read, and run errands). 
46. Compare Bright, 934 F.2d at 677-78 (finding a twenty minute response time not bur­
densome), with Oliver, 695 F.2d at 380 (noting district court's unappealed ruling that on-call 
employees who had three minutes to return to work must be compensated for their on-call 
time). 
47. In 1990, the average commuting time in the United States was 22.4 minutes. See 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TIIE 
UNITED STATES 625 (1996). 
48. According to the Fifth Circuit, "[m]illions of employees go for weeks at a time with­
out traveling more than seventeen miles from their place of employment." Bright, 934 F.2d 
at 678. 
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they could do were they not on call.49 Actual practice in the work­
place appears to reflect this conclusion, as twenty-minute response 
requirements appear to be common.so 
On the other hand, an extremely short response time - five 
minutes, for example - should compel compensation even when 
the employee bears no other burdens.51 Although such an arrange­
ment is not as burdensome as a requirement that an employee re­
main on his employer's premises - because he may be able to wait 
at home - an extremely short tether places severe limits on the on­
call employee's activity. There are very few things an employee 
may do if he must return to work in five minutes. Furthermore, the 
rapid response time provides a significant benefit to the employer 
because the matters get addressed nearly as quickly as they do 
when on-site employees do the work.52 
These three factors need only be applied if the employee is re­
quired to respond while on call. If an employee need not respond 
to an employer's call, then the time on call should not be compensa­
ble. Such an employee has, in a sense, an infinite amount of time to 
49. A twenty-minute tether would be a useful standard in most cases because it permits 
employees to pursue nearly all activities they would pursue if not on call. There may be some 
situations in which the size of the community would affect the activities the on-call employee 
would pursue if not on call, and that, therefore, should be taken into account. See Burnison, 
820 F. Supp. at 554 (concluding that a five-minute response requirement was not burdensome 
because the employees lived in a small city). Alteration of the length of the tether should 
depend on what activities are available in the workplace's community, not on the distance 
each employee lives from work. Otherwise, employees who work for the same employer and 
provide the same service at the same location might be treated differently under the FLSA. 
50. See, e.g., Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529, 1531 (10th Cir. 1991) (involving 
employees required to return to their employer's premises within 20 minutes); Bright, 934 
F.2d at 673 (same). 
51. See, e.g., Oliver, 695 F.2d 379 (noting the district court's unappealed ruling that on­
call employees who had three minutes to return to work must be compensated for their on­
call time), cf. Brown v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 585 (1994) (rejecting employer's motion for 
summary judgment when employees were required to respond in five minutes or less). 
Although Brown arose under the Federal Employees Pay Act (FEPA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 5541-5551 
(1994), the court applied the same analysis as would apply under the FLSA. 
Unless callbacks are so rare that an employee does not alter his personal activities, on-call 
duty requiring a response time of five minutes or less should be compensable, because in 
such cases the employee is essentially engaged to wait. See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 
U.S. 126, 133-34 (1944} (holding that an employee can be engaged to wait and that such an 
employee is entitled to payment of at least the minimum wage and an overtime premium); 
Birdwell v. City of Gadsden, 970 F.2d 802, 807, 810 (11th Cir. 1992} (holding, when employ­
ees had to report to their employer immediately and could not leave town, that employees 
were not entitled to compensation: because they had never been called back); see also 29 
C.F.R. § 785.17 ("An employee who is required to remain on-call on the employer's premises 
or so close thereto that he cannot use the time effectively for his own purposes is working 
while 'on-call.' "); Hours Worked/EMrs/On-Call Tune, 6A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (99 WAGE 
& HouR MAN.) 5219 (Nov. 16, 1988} (Smith, Admr.) (Wage and Hour Division of the De­
partment of Labor opinion indicating that a five-minute response time for EMrs makes the 
on-call time compensable}. But see Rousseau v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 805 F.2d 
1245 (5th Cir. 1986) (refusing to grant compensation when employees were required to re­
main on a barge for one week}. 
52. See infra section 11.B (discussing the significance of the benefit to the employer). 
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respond and is not burdened by the duty. This situation arises when 
an employer has a list of employees he designates as "on call," but 
does not require any one of them to respond. Because no em­
ployee must return to work and give up his personal pursuits, no 
employee is tied to work. This is essentially no different from call­
ing an off-duty employee to work;S3 the employee is "wait[ing] to 
be engaged"S4 and should receive no compensation. 
Determining whether a response is mandatory should depend 
on practical, factual circumstances and not merely on the em­
ployer's policy. There may be instances in which a work rule states 
that responding to a call is voluntary, when in practice a response is 
mandatory. The touchstone for the courts should be whether or not 
an employee is treated adversely for refusing to respond to calls. 
Evidence of disciplinary action against employees who do not re­
spond to calls should be enough to prove that the response is 
mandatory.ss Courts should not conclude, however, that the ar­
rangement is involuntary when those who do respond to the calls 
receive favorable treatment.s6 The FLSA seeks to constrain the 
employer's control over the workplace only in limited circum­
stances. Under the FLSA, so long as the employer pays the requi­
site minimum wage and overtime, he is free to promote employees 
and assign work as he wants.s1 
B. Benefit to Employer From On-Call Service 
The benefit to the employer is also relevant to the determina­
tion of whether an on-call employee is working under the FLSA. 
While nearly all lower courts that have examined on-call time have 
ignored this factor,ss its use is consistent with Supreme Court prece­
dent and with the equitable concerns that were central to the pas­
sage of the FLSA. 
The Supreme Court has emphasized in its waiting-time cases 
that, in defining work, the benefit accruing to an employer is impor-
53. Cf. Caryk v. Coupe, 663 F. Supp. 1243 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that chauffeurs who did 
not have to wait on the employer's premises and had no responsibilities while waiting need 
not be compensated for waiting time). 
54. See Skidmore v: Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137 (1944) ("Facts may show that the 
employee was engaged to wait, or they may show that he waited to be engaged."). An em­
ployee waiting to be engaged is not entitled to compensation under the FLSA. See Skidmore, 
323 U.S. at 136. 
55. See, e.g., Renfro, 948 F.2d at 1537 (noting that employees were subject to discipline if 
they were late for callback). 
56. See Norton v. Worthen Van Serv., Inc., 839 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
employers need to offer work to those who do not wait on the employer's premises). 
57. The FLSA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees who assert 
their rights under the Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 215(3) (1994), but it does not prohibit employers 
from rewarding employees for doing more than is required under the Act. 
58. See supra note 38. 
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tant.59 This benefit, according to the Court, need not depend on 
actual physical exertion by the employee.60 In Armour, the Court 
rejected an employer's argument that work required exertion and 
held that whether an employee was working under the Act did not 
turn solely on what the employee was doing.61 An employee hired 
to do nothing but wait may be working and thus entitled to com­
pensation by the FLSA.62 The relevant question is "[w]hether time 
is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit or for the em­
ployee's. "63 Likewise, in deciding whether an on-call employee is 
working, consideration of the benefit to the employer is critical. 
In fact, the value of the service to the employer was an impor­
tant consideration in Congress's establishment of the minimum 
wage. Promoting fairness to employees was a central motivation 
behind passage of the FLSA; the minimum wage and overtime pro­
visions were intended in part to ensure that workers received fair 
payment for the benefit they produced.64 As introduced in the Sen­
ate, the bill that became the FLSA defined a "fair wage" as one 
"commensurate with the value of the service or class of service ren­
dered."65 Although the bill as enacted replaced this language with 
a specific minimum wage, Congress did not reject the principle.66 
There is also evidence that Congress embraced this principle be-
59. See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944). 
60. See Armour, 323 U.S. at 133. 
61. See Armour, 323 U.S. at 133; see also Reich v. New York City Transit Auth., 45 F.3d 
646, 651 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that compensation for work may be required where the em­
ployee does not exert himself). But see Phillips v. Lake County, 721 P.2d 326, 334 (Mont. 
1986) (applying the FLSA and holding that on-call employees were not entitled to compensa­
tion solely because they did not exert themselves); Berry v. County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1114 
(9th Cir. 1994). Berry involved coroners who were placed on call after a normal daytime 
shift. Because people die at all times of the day, coroners were called upon to investigate 
deaths during their on-call shifts in much the same way as they would have if somebody had 
died during their regular shifts. Despite the fact that the coroners did the same kind of work 
during both normal and on-call shifts, the court held that they were "waiting to be engaged" 
and denied them compensation for their on-call time. Berry's holding is unsound, however, 
because the court did not adequately consider the similarity between the on-call service and 
the regular service. See infra notes 69-13 and accompanying text. 
62. See Armour, 323 U.S. at 132-33. 
· 
63. Armour, 323 U.S. at 133. 
64. The statute's chief advocate, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, wanted to ensure that a 
person would receive a "fair day's pay for a fair day's work." Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1937: Joint Hearings on S. 2475 & H.R. 7200 Before the Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor 
and the House of Representatives Comm on Labor, 15th Cong. 139 (1931) 54-55 [hereinafter 
Joint Hearings] (quoting message of President Roosevelt, 81 CoNG. REc. 4983 (1931)). 
65. Fair Labor Standards Act, S. 2415, 15th Cong. § 2(a)(14) (1931) (bill as reported to 
the full Senate on May 24, 1931). 
66. The rejection of the provision had nothing to do with the equitable concern about 
employers who gained unfairly from the work of an employee. Congress eliminated the pro­
vision that called for a board to set a minimum wage because of widespread concern that the 
board would set a lower minimum wage in parts of the South and West, thereby giving those 
regions a competitive advantage. See, e.g., 83 CoNG. REC. 7215 (1938) (statement of Rep. 
Norton); 82 CONG. REc. 1396-97 (1931) (statement of Rep. Griswold). 
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cause many of the bill's proponents feared that the courts would 
strike down a wage not based on the value of the service to the 
employer.67 
General policy concerns embedded in the FLSA also militate in 
favor of considering the benefits afforded employers from on-call 
service. The employer knows the employee will complete the task 
the employer needs done, even though the employee is not physi­
cally present. Having an employee who will respond to a call en­
ables the employer to keep his workforce lean.6s If the employee 
did not have to respond, then the employer either would have to go 
without the service or would have to pay somebody at least the 
minimum wage to be present at the place of employment. 
Courts should calculate how much benefit accrues to an em­
ployer by comparing the on-call service to regular service. The em­
ployer's placement of a worker on a regular shift indicates that the 
employer values the worker's services at the minimum wage or 
higher. When the on-call duty resembles regular duty in terms of 
the service provided at the employer's workplace, it should be con­
sidered work and thus compensable under the FLSA.69 Similarly, 
when an on-call employee does something akin to another em­
ployee's on-premises work, a significant benefit inures to the em­
ployer, weighing in favor of compensation.70 The Supreme Court in 
Skidmore called on lower courts to examine the relation between 
waiting time and normal work time,71 and the facts of Armour12 
67. The advocates of the FLSA believed that basing the minimum wage in part on the 
value of service was critical to its viability. The manager of the bill in the House of Repre­
sentatives responded to the argument that a bill containing a uniform minimum wage would 
be unconstitutional by inserting into the Congressional Record this statement by a Roosevelt 
administration lawyer: "A minimum [wage] cannot be set without taking into consideration 
the value of services rendered." 83 CoNG. REc. 7306 {1938) (statement of Ben Cohen, in­
serted by Rep. Norton). Cohen also stated that a low minimum wage would be easier to 
justify constitutionally because it would not be hard to show that the services were worth the 
amount set. See id. Furthermore, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson testified: "[A] mini­
mum-wage law, Federal or State, which paid no regard to the fixing of the value of the serv­
ices, would be on dangerous constitutional ground." Joint Hearings, supra note 64, at 88. 
68. See Miller, supra note 3, at 57. 
69. Berry v. County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1994), illustrates that the benefit to 
the employer is high when on-call service resembles regular service. That case involved on­
call coroners who performed many investigations while on call. In many instances, the coro­
ners needed to respond quickly in order to investigate or to record the deaths. Because 
deaths occur at all times of the day and night, the coroners could not control the flow of their 
work; it is possible that as many investigations occur during on-call hours as during regular 
hours. In such a situation, the employer is getting as much benefit from the on-call service as 
from the regular service. The similarity between on-call duty and regular duty may also sug­
gest that the burden on the employee is greater because an employee generally has less con­
trol over his time when at work than at home. See Berry, 30 F.3d at 1183-84. 
70. Cf. Brock v. EI Paso Natural Gas Co., 826 F.2d 369 {5th Cir. 1987) {denying compen­
sation to gas pipeline employees who served as security guards during on-call time). 
71. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1944). 
72. See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 127-28 (1944). 
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suggest that on-call time that resembles other work time should be 
compensable. In Armour, firefighters were required to remain on 
the employer's premises while not on their regular shifts. The court 
held that the employer had to compensate them because as 
firefighters they were hired to wait.73 Thus, when an employee's 
activity - or inactivity - while on call is similar to his normal on­
premises duty, there is a strong implication that the value to the 
employer is higher, entitling the employee to compensation. 
In sum, compensability for on-call service under the FLSA de­
pends on what the employee does, what he is unable to do with his 
personal life because of the constraints placed on him, and how 
much the employer gains from his service. Focusing on the number 
and length of the calls and the speed with which an employee must 
respond captures both the employee's exertion and the constraints 
the service imposes. Considering the value of the on-call service is 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the Act's legislative 
history. Courts should therefore use this analysis to fill the gaps left 
by the statute. 
ill. ELIMINATING EXTRANEOUS FACTORS 
This Part argues that courts have frequently considered irrele­
vant factors when deciding whether an on-call employee must re­
ceive compensation, and offers two rules to prevent courts from 
getting side-tracked. In section III.A, this Part argues that it is ir­
relevant that an employee may trade an on-call shift; once an em­
ployee has taken a shift, it should not matter that he once had the 
option to trade it away. In section III.B, this Part contends that it is 
irrelevant whether or not particular on-call employees have agreed 
not to receive compensation, as the FLSA prohibits employers or 
employees from contracting around the requirements of the Act. 
A. Trading Shifts 
In a number of cases, courts .have inquired whether employees 
may trade on-call shifts.74 These courts reasoned that if an em­
ployee could trade on-call shifts, the employee would have more 
freedom from the demands of the employer, and his burden there­
fore would be lighter.75 Correspondingly, in these courts' view, an 
73. See Armour, 323 U.S. at 133. 
74. See, e.g., Service Employees Intl. Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 60 F.3d 
1346, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 774 (1996); Berry, 30 F.3d at 1184-85; 
O'Brien v. DeKalb-Clinton Counties Ambulance Dist, 3 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 37 
(W.D. Mo. 1995); Matthew M. Smith & Steven H. Winterbauer, Overtime Compensation 
Under the FLSA: Pay Them Now or Pay Them Later, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 23, 40, 44 
(1993) (noting that courts consider an employee's freedom to trade on-call shifts). 
75. See, e.g., Owens v. TIT Rayonier, Inc., 971 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding the 
ability to trade on-call responsibility important in determining whether an employee could 
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employee who could not trade on-call time would face a greater 
burden. 
Whether employers permit employees to trade on-call shifts 
should not enter into the determination of whether an employee is 
working while on call. The ability to trade shifts does not change 
the nature of the time spent while actually on call. How the em­
ployee came to perform the service should not matter: "'[T]he cru­
cial question [under the FLSA] is not whether the work was 
voluntary, but rather whether the [p ]Iaintiff was in fact performing 
services for the benefit of the employer with the knowledge and 
approval of the employer. "'76 An employee who accepts a normal 
shift of work must be compensated, even though he voluntarily ac­
cepted it and possibly could have traded it. On-call time should be 
treated no differently. 
The difference between trading on-call shifts and trading the 
duty to respond when actually on call is critical. The ability to trade 
an on-call shift allows the employee respite from work but does not 
alter the constraints on the employee or the benefit to the em­
ployer. By contrast, if an employee who is on call may get another 
employee to respond to a call, the burden on the first employee is 
much lower because he is not constrained - he need not return a 
call.77 
One could argue that the ability to trade on-call duty ensures 
that an employee is completely free from work at some time during 
his employment, lightening that employee's burden. In some cir­
cumstances, an employee may be on call for the entire time he is 
not working on his normal shift, and some courts have considered 
such continual on-call duty an added burden weighing in favor of 
compensability.78 An employee who is always on call may never be 
able to visit other parts of the country or take a second job, and 
may be affected psychologically by the inability ever to be com­
pletely free from work. Allowing an employee to trade an on-call 
engage in personal pursuits); Brock, 826 F.2d at 373 {finding that trading of waiting duty 
permits employees to leave their employer's premises). 
76. Truslow v. Spotsylvania County Sheriff, 783 F. Supp. 274, 278 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quot­
ing Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 251 {1956)). 
77. Compare Brock, 826 F.2d at 373 (referring, apparently, to the ability to trade the duty 
to respond while on call) with Berry, 30 F.3d at 1184-85 (considering the relevance of the 
ability to trade on-call shifts). 
78. See Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Commn., 938 F.2d 912, 917 (8th Cir. 1991) (consider­
ing whether an employee has a respite from the on-call duty); Darrah v. Missouri Highway & 
Transp. Commn., 885 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (considering the burden on an em­
ployee from continual on-call service). But see Bright v. Houston Northwest Med. Ctr. Survi­
vor, Inc., 934 F.2d 671, 679-80 (5th Cir. 1991) (en bane) {holding that the FLSA does not 
account for the burden of continual on-call duty); M.D. Rubenstein, Recent Development, 66 
Tur.. L. REv. 1517 (1992) {discussing Bright's analysis of continual on-call duty). 
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shift therefore might be justified as a way to reduce the burden 
caused by the accumulation of past on-call duty. 
While continual on-call duty is harsh, the FLSA does not pro­
vide relief in this area, as the accumulation of past on-call duty can­
not support compensation. The overtime premium compensates 
employees for working long hours. That premium does not in­
crease once the forty-hour week threshold has passed, and it begins 
anew every week.79 An employee who has worked one hundred 
hours in one week, for example, is not entitled to additional consid­
eration the following week if a question of compensable time 
arises.80 Thus, courts should not use the ability to trade an on-call 
shift as evidence that an employee is not burdened. Courts should 
look at the period of time in question and examine the benefit to 
the employer and the burden on the employee to determine 
whether an employee has worked. 
B. Employment Agreements 
This Section argues that employers may not contract around the 
requirements of the FLSA to avoid compensating on-call employ­
ees. Some courts have relied on the existence of employment 
agreements in finding that on-call time is not compensable.81 Im­
plicit in this reasoning is a belief that employers and employees 
know more than courts about the nature of the on-call time and 
that they can therefore better determine whether such time is work 
or not. 
This approach, however, contradicts the FLSA. It both conflicts 
with Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 82 and undermines the principles at the 
foundation of the FLSA. Agreements are relevant only insofar as 
they help to determine how an employee is constrained while on 
call. 
79. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(l) (1994); see also Bright, 934 F.2d at 678 (noting that the 
FLSA is structured on the basis of a work week). 
80. See Bright, 934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the argument that an employee who 
was always on call when not at work faced a sufficient burden to require compensation). 
81. A number of courts have given weight to the existence of the agreement, not just its 
substance. See Brock, 826 F.2d at 374 & n.8 (giving weight to the existence of an agreement, 
declining to examine the reasonableness of the agreement under the FLSA, and holding that 
an agreement is a "'circumstance to consider"' (quoting Allen v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 724 
F.2d 1131, 1136 (5th Cir. 1984))); Rousseau v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 805 F.2d 
1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the existence of an agreement is a fact to consider); 
Allen, 724 F.2d at 1135 (considering the mere existence of agreement); Brown v. Luk, Inc., 3 
Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 560, 564 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (indicating that the existence of an 
agreement was relevant independent of consideration of the burden on the employee); 
Cleary v. ADM Milling Co., 827 F. Supp. 472, 476 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding the existence of an 
agreement regarding on-call time damaging to the employee's claim). 
82. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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Even when the facts of a case would otherwise lead a court to 
conclude that an employee is working while on call and is thus enti­
tled to compensation under the FLSA, the reasoning of some courts 
would allow agreements between employers and employees to pre­
clude payment for on-call time.83 Those who believe agreements 
should receive weight argue that resolving the question of whether 
certain activity or inactivity constitutes work requires a more subtle 
inquiry than a court may be able to accomplish. According to this 
view, the parties know best whether employees are working while 
on call, and their own conclusion, as embodied in their agreement, 
is of value.84 An employer and its employees certainly know more 
about the nature of the duties of on-call employees than would a 
court.85 Presumably, an employee who is indeed working would 
not accept an agreement that denied him the minimum wage. 
The notion that agreements can be weighed, or even be disposi­
tive, stems from Skidmore. 86 In Skidmore, the Court stated that 
courts should examine agreements in determining whether an em­
ployee is working while on waiting time: "The law does not impose 
an arrangement upon the parties. It imposes upon the courts the 
task of :finding what the arrangement was."87 Some courts have in­
terpreted "arrangement" to mean "agreement," and have con-
83. See Brock, 826 F.2d at 374 (giving the existence of an agreement weight in concluding 
that on-call time was not compensable}; see also supra note 81. 
In 1985, the Department of Labor issued a bulletin indicating that agreements could re­
solve the issue in some circumstances. See Wage-Hour Division Publication 1459 (May 1985) 
(opining that when an on-call employee is "uninterrupted for long periods of time, any rea­
sonable agreement of the parties for determining the number of hours worked will be ac­
cepted"}. The Department's interpretation of this issue is only entitled to deference to the 
extent it is persuasive. See supra note 21. As this section argues, that interpretation is not 
persuasive to the extent other factors, see supra Part II and supra note 51 (involving very 
short response times), indicate compensation is required and the agreement does not reflect 
this. The test of reasonableness must be based on the requirements of the statute, not on the 
opinions of the parties. 
84. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 
169-70 (1945) (declining to decide whether employees may resolve the question of what is 
working time); Service Employees Intl. Union, Local 102 v. County of San Diego, 60 F.3d 
1346, 1355 {9th Cir. 1995) (noting that an "employment agreement between the parties sug­
gests [the employer and employee] envisioned on-site night duty as work"); Berry v. County 
of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174, 1181 {9th Cir. 1994) (noting that "the existence of such [on-call] 
agreements assists the trier of fact in determining whether the parties characterized the time 
spent waiting on-call as actual work"); cf. 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 {1994) (allowing agreements to 
control when an employee remains on the employer's premises because it is "difficult to 
determine the exact hours worked under these circumstances"). In contrast, the regulations 
providing guidance for "waiting-time" situations do not state that agreements will be disposi­
tive. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.14-.19. 
85. See Berry, 30 F.3d 1174. The court in Berry explicitly stated that agreements cannot 
be dispositive of the issue. See 30 F.3d at 1180 n.5. Nonetheless, it went on to conclude, 
despite some evidence to the contrary, that the on-call time was not compensable, in large 
part because of the weight accorded to the existence of an agreement between the employers 
and employees regarding on-call time. See 30 F.3d at 1187. 
86. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
frl. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 137. 
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eluded that the agreement that the parties have reached must be 
enforced.88 This view maintains that because the court cannot med­
dle with an agreement, its inquiry ends with what the agreement 
says. 
Skidmore cannot be used to support the argument that agree­
ments are to be given weight in and of themselves. Had the agree­
ment in Skidmore been dispositive, the Court would have 
remanded to the lower court only to examine the agreement. 
Moreover, less than a year after deciding Skidmore, the Supreme 
Court in Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine 
Workers89 refused to embrace Justice Jackson's argument that Skid­
more meant that employees and employers could decide for them­
selves whether on-call time was "work." Instead, the Court 
indicated that in that case it would not reach questions involving 
"the use of bona fide contracts or customs to settle difficult ques­
tions as to whether certain activity or nonactivity constitutes 
work."90 
The FLSA does not suggest that employers and employees may 
decide that certain on-call time is not work. In fact, to do so would 
undermine the Act's central premise that employees do not have 
adequate bargaining power to ensure a fair minimum wage for their 
labor.91 The statute does not mention on-call service, but nothing 
in the text suggests that an employer may contract around the re­
quirement that all employees receive compensation for work.92 
The language of the FLSA shows that such compensation is 
mandatory: "Every employer shall pay to each of his employees" 
the required minimum wage.93 The overtime provision is similarly 
emphatic: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, no em­
ployer shall employ any of his employees . . .  for a workweek longer 
than forty hours unless such employee receives [an overtime 
premium]. "94 
88. See Brock, 826 F.2d at 374 (indicating that the mere existence of an agreement can be 
relevant to detennining whether an employee must be compensated under the FLSA); cf. 
supra note 82 (listing cases considering relevant the existence of an agreement). 
89. 325 U.S. 161 (1945). 
90. 325 U.S. at 169-70. 
91. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1945) (noting that the FLSA 
is a response to unequal bargaining power between employers and employees); cf. Barren­
tine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981) (noting that the intention of 
the FLSA "was to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive work­
ing hours"); Berry v. County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving 
employees who claimed that the "agreement" was not the product of real negotiation and as 
such was not something to which they had agreed). 
92. The FLSA specifically allows certain agreements to trump the minimum wage and 
overtime requirements. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(b)(l), (b)(2), (e)(7), (f) (1994). None of the 
exceptions, however, applies to on-call time. 
-
93. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
94. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) {1994). 
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The statutory requirement of minimum pay for all hours worked 
reveals an intent to protect workers from inequitable agreements 
regarding wages and hours. Given disparities in bargaining power, 
employers could reach agreements with employees to pay less than 
the minimum wage for on-call service, even when those employees 
would be working under the Act. If employees had sufficient 
power to protect themselves, there would be no reason to require 
payment of the minimum wage. Thus, certain considerations 
should not be left to free market forces because they inevitably will 
weigh in favor of the employer: an agreement may reflect relative 
bargaining power more than it reflects the realities of the work en­
vironment. The Supreme Court has plainly indicated that agree­
ments cannot supersede the FLSA. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight System, Inc. ,9s the Court held that " '[a]ny custom or con­
tract falling short of [the] basic policy [of the FLSA], like an agree­
ment to pay less than the minimum wage requirements, cannot be 
utilized to deprive employees of their statutory rights.' "96 
The overtime provision also indicates that employers and em­
ployees may not contract around the requirements of the Act. The 
Congress that passed the FLSA clearly intended to protect against 
unfair and unreasonable agreements that did not meet the mini­
mum requirements of the Act,97 but it also attempted to create 
more jobs by spreading work.98 The overtime premium was 
designed to create a disincentive to employers who want to keep 
their staffs small despite a large amount of work. In order to spread 
work, the FLSA does not apply only to the lowest-paid workers; the 
overtime provisions control even in higher-wage industries.99 These 
issues were a matter of much debate. The bill as introduced in the 
95. 450 U.S. 728 (1981). 
96. 450 U.S. at 741 (quoting Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 
U.S. 590, 602-03 (1944)). In Barrentine, the Court considered whether an employee could 
bring an FLSA claim in federal court despite a collective bargaining agreement stating that 
such claims were to be resolved only by joint grievance committees. The Court rejected the 
argument that an agreement could prevent employees from seeking the enforcement of their 
rights under the FLSA in federal court. See 450 U.S. at 740-41. 
97. See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 64, at 182 (statement of Francis Perkins, Secretary 
of Labor); id. at 209 (statement of Sen. Pepper); id. at 22 (statement of Robert H. Jackson, 
Attorney General}. 
98. See, e.g, 82 CONG. REc. 1391 (1937) ("This bill will eventually decrease unemploy­
ment if the employers of the country will face the issue in a practical manner and cooperate 
by spreading their work over a greater number.") (statement of Rep. Norton); see also 
Mumbower v. Callicott, 526 F.2d 1183, 1188 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting that the intention of the 
FLSA is to spread work to more employees). In a colloquy with a Works Progress Adminis­
tration economist, Senator Robert LaFollette asked what the effect of the 40-hour work week 
would be. The economist replied that one and one-half million unemployed people would go 
back to work. See Joint Hearings, supra note 65, at 95. 
99. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United ¥ine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 
167 (1945) (noting that "employees are not to be deprived of the benefits of the [Fair Labor 
Standards) Act simply because they are well paid"). 
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Senate and reported to the House of Representatives would have 
exempted from the FLSA employees bound by collective­
bargaining agreements, but only if such agreements produced a 
wage above the minimum and a work week under the maximum. 
The exemption for collective bargaining agreements was eliminated 
in the House and was not part of the bill when signed into law.100 
The statute therefore rejects the notion that employees and em­
ployers have complete freedom to contract regarding their employ­
men t.101 That approach had created the often oppressive 
conditions that the FLSA meant to remedy. To allow agreements 
to reduce in any way the protection offered by the Act would un­
dermine its central goals. 
The Court in Skidmore explained how courts should use agree­
ments. Skidmore called for lower courts to consider other factors 
beyond an agreement in deciding whether the employees were 
working. Such an appraisal 
involves scrutiny and construction of the agreements between the par­
ticular parties, appraisal of their practical construction of the working 
agreement by conduct, consideration of the nature of the service, and 
its relation to the waiting time, and all of the surrounding circum­
stances. Facts may show that the employee was engaged to wait, or 
they may show that he waited to be engaged. His compensation may 
cover both waiting and task, or only performance of the task itself . . . .  
The law does not impose an arrangement upon the parties. It imposes 
upon the courts the task of finding what the arrangement was.102 
This statement calls for a broad examination and interpretation 
of the on-call arrangement. First, "appraisal of their practical con­
struction of the working agreement by conduct" instructs courts to 
see how the agreement plays out in practice. This should include 
inquiries into things like the length of time an employee has before 
she must return to work and any restrictions on her activities while 
on call.103 Second, "consideration of the nature of the service, and 
its relation to the waiting time" tells courts to examine what exactly 
the employee is doing while on call. Courts thus may examine how 
on-call time compares to the other time the employee spends work-
100. See, e.g., H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 75-2738 (1938). There was some confusion about the 
meaning of the collective bargaining agreement provision, as some feared that it could be 
used to evade the requirements of the Act. See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 64, at 21-22 
(colloquy between Sen. Ellender and Robert H. Jackson, Attorney General). 
101. See, e.g., Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) 
("FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would 'nul­
lify the purposes' of the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectu­
ate." (quoting Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945))); Lerwill v. Inflight 
Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 513-14 (9th Cir. 1978). 
102. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137 (1944). 
103. See supra section II.A. 
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ing.104 Third, "all of the surrounding circumstances" allows courts 
to examine a range of factors that do not fit into the first two 
categories. ms 
In other words, an agreement should be used to help determine 
the extent of the restriction on the on-call employee and the benefit 
the employer receives from the service. If the agreement sets out 
restrictions so severe that an employee cannot use the on-call time 
for his own purposes, the employee must receive compensation, 
whether or not he has been called upon by the employer. An agree­
ment may so constrain an on-call employee's freedom that he may 
not effectively use the time for his own purposes even if he returns 
only infrequently to the employer's premises.106 Courts should 
therefore adopt the approach advocated in Part II, and examine the 
agreement in light of how it burdens the on-call employee and ben­
efits the employer.107 The objective character of the on-call duty, 
not the employee's or the employer's characterization of it, should 
be the central concern. Agreements that attempt to dispose of the 
issue without regard to the employment situation replace the FLSA 
and the proper analysis of what is work. An agreement that does 
not pay at least the minimum wage and overtime for on-call duty is 
relevant only to the extent it affects the actual burden on the em­
ployee and the benefit to the employer. 
CONCLUSION 
The difficulty courts have had in creating a coherent analysis for 
determining whether on-call service is compensable stems from the 
FLSA's silence on this precise issue and the vagueness of fifty-year­
old Supreme Court guidance on a similar issue. Because of this, 
courts have created an analysis that too often is based on their own 
conceptions of what service should be compensated and have 
strayed from the guidance the statute and the Supreme Court have 
provided. This Note has proposed an approach grounded in the 
104. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
105. One such circumstance may be what the employee can do within the area circum­
scribed by the response time. See discussion of commuting distances supra note 47 and ac­
companying text. 
106. See, e.g., Oliver v. Mercy Med. Qr., Inc., 695 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1982) (indicating that 
an employee was working while on call where he was called only about two times per on-call 
shift but was required to return to work within three minutes of the call). 
107. See Martin v. Ohio Turnpike Commn., 968 F.2d 606, 611-12 (6th Cir. 1992) (examin­
ing an agreement to determine how onerous the on-call duty is); Boehm v. Kansas City 
Power & Light Co., 868 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 1989) (same). 
In addition, an agreement that provides employees with greater freedom cannot defeat 
compensation if the facts show that the time is spent primarily for the employer's benefit. In 
Armour, the employees had the freedom to engage in a variety of recreational activities while 
on call. That freedom was not dispositive, however, and the employees were awarded com­
pensation. See Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 127 (1944). 
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FLSA's conception of work and has argued against analyses that 
are not consistent with the Act. Use of this analysis would ensure a 
more consistent determination of when on-call service is work. 
This issue will continue to gain importance as on-call arrange­
ments become more common. Indeed, Congress should act - it 
could, for example, separate on-call time from regular work time 
and set a different minimum wage for on-call time, or it could ex­
empt on-call service from the overtime requirements. Any of these 
actions would assure some compensation to workers who have lost 
a measure of their freedom and would fairly reflect the extent to 
which employers benefit from their employees' service. At the 
same time, such action would reflect the fact that most on-call ar­
rangements are neither as demanding for workers nor as valuable 
to employers as regular time, and may not merit payment at an em­
ployee's regular rate. In the absence of Congressional action, how­
ever, this Note provides analysis to make the resolution of this 
question more coherent and more consistent with the goals of the 
FLSA. 
